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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 March 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. György Boytha (Hungary)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 676th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It has become my turn and honour to assume the presidency of the Conference. I am supposed to have the Chair for a rather long period and to cooperate with you as President until the end of May. This period of presidency covers the two last weeks of the first period of our session and the two first weeks of the next session; in between we shall have an inter-sessional period, too. I wish to thank you in advance for your cooperation and I wish to pledge that I shall do my best to be of assistance to you in order to develop your own ideas. I consider my task to be that of catalysing the development of collective wisdom and I shall try to channel the discussions in a way so that all of you can contribute to the outcome which is hoped for this ongoing session. My work has been made a lot easier by the efficient work performed by my predecessors and I wish to thank from the Chair Ambassador Errera and Ambassador Hoffmann for the work they have done. In actual fact, the work of the ad hoc committees has started and is going on in a businesslike manner; there seems to be no problem in this regard. The Special Coordinators, Ambassadors Norberg and Shannon, have already started their consultations on the cut-off of production of fissile material and the agenda, respectively, and we hope that they shall report to us in one of the forthcoming meetings already. There is one serious problem which we have to face and this is the unsolved question of the expansion of the membership of the CD. In this respect, I have it also somewhat easier than my predecessors, because Ambassador Hoffmann, with the agreement of both Ambassador Errera and myself, has appointed without any objection on your part, as a Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil. I wish to confirm his appointment on my part and I should like to ask him to help me by doing his best in order to find a way out of the impasse concerning the expansion of our membership. I also shall do my best to help him and we shall try to improve the situation also by looking for further possibilities to frame, to cast an acceptable mandate which has not been considered so far and to "upgrade" his status as Friend of the Chair to that of a Special Coordinator. Whether we shall have success to this end is an open question but we should strive to find a solution because we are under pressure of time.

The current activities of the Conference on Disarmament cannot be conceived as "conducting business as usual". The Conference has seized the historic opportunity to negotiate a comprehensive and global ban on nuclear testing. The international community had to wait a long time for these talks to begin, yet the intensity of the work carried on in this domain indicates a genuine interest to find solutions to the political and technical problems that have to be faced. The well-structured discussions on the possible contents of a treaty are very substantial and promising. There, of course, remains a lot to be done before a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty can be concluded.

(The President)

The time allocated to the negotiations on a nuclear test ban clearly indicates the importance attached by the Conference to this item of our agenda. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of other items of the agenda that are hardly less important to address. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, I cannot fail to underline the significance attached to the question of increasing transparency related to military matters. Not only am I honoured by assuming the presidency of this important subsidiary body of the Conference, but I also feel professional satisfaction in attempting to fulfil my duties in this regard. I am personally convinced that transparency in armaments is a topic of the multilateral disarmament and security forums that should continue to get the attention it requires. It cannot be contested that transparency in armaments, if appropriately pursued, can become a major element of security equations both in a global and regional sense, and in this context I thank already those distinguished members who have made pertinent statements in the course of discussions we had so far.

The fact that I do not touch upon other issues considered currently in the Conference on Disarmament does not mean a lack of interest on my part. Rather, it indicates a wish to spare our time for substantive contributions of member States. In conclusion, let me reiterate that I count on your support in the same spirit of cooperation we had the opportunity to witness during the first two months of the 1994 session. In this context I also wish to express my thanks for the work that has been done so far by the secretariat, in particular for the authority offered to us by the Secretary-General, His Excellency Vladimir Petrovsky, and the assistance of the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Bensmail, and I ask the secretariat to help us also in the future in the forthcoming part of our work.

This having been said now, we have to turn to our substantive work. I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Japan, Switzerland, China, New Zealand and Sweden. I give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that your abilities as a diplomat and your experience will make a very efficient contribution to the work of our Conference. The words you have just spoken are encouraging for us. I can assure you of the full cooperation of the Algerian delegation. I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann, who guided our previous work with great success. I also welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Richard Starr of Australia.

I should like to speak to the question of the nuclear test ban. My delegation reaffirms the relevance of the recommendations and views expressed in Group of 21 documents CD/1231 of 11 February 1994 and CD/1252 of 23 March 1994, which set out a general approach that we share. I would, however, like to add a

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few comments which the Algerian delegation will clarify further in the course of the negotiations.

For the time being, the positive impression that we have of the negotiations under way has been tempered somewhat by statements made here and there in support of particular rights to be reserved to certain Powers. We would say that our concern for a rapid and positive outcome to the negotiations could not lead us to accept the reproduction of a situation of inequality. We believe that the majority of States place the test ban in the perspective of universal, general and complete nuclear disarmament. It would therefore be a mistake to believe that some States could be accorded the right to retain indefinitely a monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons.

I should now like to turn to certain aspects of the treaty. First of all its general characteristics. The test-ban treaty must be universal, non-discriminatory and open to signature by all States and should include no clause favouring any of the signatory parties in any manner, shape or form. As to the definition of tests, the wording in the partial test-ban Treaty, although imperfect, offers a sufficient basis. It does leave open a doubt as to nuclear explosions that do not have the status of military tests, which it seems to cover, but it has the merit of avoiding the attempt to reach a consensus, which would be very difficult to achieve, on greater precision. As to the scope of application of the ban, the treaty should ban all tests of nuclear explosives everywhere.

Let us take a closer look at some of the aspects of the scope of application. The ban should cover preparatory activities, even if this ban raises difficulties in terms of verification, because verification should not serve only to allow the recording of a violation of an international commitment, but also to prevent it. A single test would imperil the balance created by the treaty. Under the existing system of international relations, detecting preparatory activities conducted by a permanent member country of the Security Council, for example, could lead to diplomatic actions designed to dissuade it from carrying out a test; a posteriori notification that such a State had carried out a nuclear test would be pointless. The ban should not be tied to any particular yield threshold. It is true that this ambitious objective will pose major verification problems, because it is always possible to envisage a situation in which some low-intensity explosions might not be detected. However, above and beyond the general commitment of States to act in good faith in applying rules accepted in a sovereign manner, a verification regime that benefited from the development of technologies would one day detect any violations of the treaty.

As to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, we are waiting for convincing and scientifically well-founded explanations to prove that a ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by means of a treaty is absolutely necessary, that it does not block potentialities for economic and social

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development, and that it could be uniformly respected. The fact that it is impossible to distinguish between two possible uses arising from a scientific discovery has never previously been judged sufficient to justify a halt to experiments in any particular area. Is it possible, without an in-depth discussion on this subject and without an adequate exchange of knowledge and findings drawn from explosions for peaceful purposes conducted previously, to decide in a treaty that they will henceforth be unlawful? Posing this question in no way diminishes our commitment to finding a consensus on banning such explosions. As to simulations, we would certainly prefer to have them banned. But we know that such a ban would be unreliable in the absence of means of verification. We also know that a ban without appropriate verification machinery is dangerous for the general balance of the treaty and its viability: banning simulations without having means of verification might imperil the entire proliferation system. As to safety tests, maintaining such a "right" for certain nuclear Powers would make nonsense of the commitment to a complete and universal test ban. Moreover, it would once again start up a sterile debate on the purpose of the international non-proliferation regime as a whole. What would be the justification for a new unequal regime? What viability would it have?

As to the verification system, the objective to be set as regards verification affects the entirety of the system to be established. We think we should not limit ourselves to simply recording violations or reacting a posteriori, but as far as possible we should try to prevent them. Monitoring of sites is a means of prevention. On the other hand, we must not seek perfection in advance, but devise machinery capable of continuous improvement. The clauses of the treaty should not, however, automatically depend on verification, otherwise they will be constantly called into question by technological developments. The verification system must be non-discriminatory. This means that it will be based on a single set of rules in terms of rights and duties for all the signatories. This system should complement and reinforce the arrangements currently in force, or those to be put into effect in the future, and not constitute a parallel system. The best possible use must be made of all existing international verification machinery in order to limit costs.

Quite clearly, the scope and verification aspects are very closely associated. We are under no illusions as to how the future verification system will be applied: the countries that have the means to observe preparations are the same ones that have surveillance capabilities. They are also the ones that might be tempted to carry out safety tests.

The costs incurred in connection with inspections should follow the pattern stipulated under the chemical weapons Convention: they will be borne by the organization for routine inspections, and by the State requesting them for challenge inspections. We have no preference for any particular means of verification, provided that it is universally and uniformly applied. Seismic monitoring and the detection of radionuclides seem the best-known and

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best-understood means. Why not start building the notification system around these two methods?

Training and access to technology: no clause should be interpreted as limiting the right of States to acquire nuclear facilities and technologies for peaceful use. This is not simply a rhetorical claim - for many dual-use technologies the developed countries find it normal to apply a double standard based on the relations they have with the recipient State rather than its real objectives. The universal nature of the right to development must be taken into account.

To enhance the verification system, its universality and its non-discriminatory nature, verification techniques and procedures which are currently known only to some Powers must be made more widely known, on the pattern of what has happened with the Convention on chemical weapons. Standardization of methods of interpreting recorded signals makes this essential. This would enhance the verification system as a whole.

While recognizing the relevance of the discussion of who will be responsible for verification of the future treaty, we tend to favour more rational use of the resources already available. We will not oppose any consensus that may emerge on the creation of an autonomous body which would draw on the experience of IAEA, for example. However, cost must remain a constant concern. Should a new organization be created, we believe that it would be a good idea for it to follow the structure suggested for the chemical weapons organization, in other words a conference of States parties and an executive council set up on the basis of equitable geographical distribution.

The system of analysis for seismic or non-seismic phenomena should be neither centralized nor monopolized by a limited number of States. All States parties should have access to the same information.

As to the duration of the treaty, it must be unlimited in time but contain machinery for periodic review. As to entry into force, the constraints of the future treaty necessitate accession by as many States as possible before it enters into force. All the proposals that we have heard so far involve limits. In particular, there is no link between entry into force and the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. The suggestion made by the Russian delegation - accession by States with nuclear power stations and reactors - is noteworthy: it is easy to count and identify these States. However, most countries which possess nuclear reactors accept the surveillance machinery of IAEA. Would the general system of non-proliferation really be strengthened if the entry into force of the treaty were dependent on ratification by these States alone? In any event, we consider that ratification of the treaty by the nuclear States is essential for its entry into force. We could associate ourselves with the reproduction of the formula taken from the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would allow entry into force before ratification of the treaty by all States. As was

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shown by the pull-along effect during the final phase of negotiation of the Convention banning chemical weapons, national declarations could play an important role when the negotiation and drafting of the treaty have reached a sufficiently advanced level. As to sanctions, the treaty should contain provision for sanctions against States parties which violate their treaty obligations. However, in keeping with the principles of equality and non-discrimination on which this treaty should be based, we feel that these sanctions should be provided for in the body of the treaty itself. The idea of expressly contemplating sanctions against States which do not sign the convention seems to us indefensible. It violates numerous principles, including that of sovereignty, and would constitute a disastrous precedent in international relations. We would prefer the idea of incentives to sign.

Turning to links with other international treaties, the future treaty is simply one element in the general non-proliferation system. There is an undeniable interdependence between all international instruments relating to disarmament. Except in so far as we must avoid all discrepancies between commitments made under the future treaty and other multilateral instruments, there would be no point in attempting to reproduce imbalances in rights and obligations which, under the pretext of stability, aim at perpetuating existing situations. As to withdrawal clauses, we believe that no clause in the treaty should be capable of being interpreted as entitling a State party to denounce the treaty, and hence to carry out tests, and hence to call into question the entire international non-proliferation system, and hence - finally - to imperil the security of the other members of the international community.

Before concluding, I should like to state our conviction that we must start drafting the treaty as rapidly as possible. We will shortly arrive at a critical deadline concerning the entire present system of nuclear non-proliferation. The negotiations under way on the nuclear-test-ban treaty, like those which we hope will shortly be carried out on the issues of negative security assurances or on the production of fissile material, in fact constitute a foundation for the work of the NPT review conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Algeria for his statement and for the very kind words addressed to the Chair.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I would like at the outset to congratulate you on behalf of the Egyptian delegation on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Your wide diplomatic experience and personal qualities will effectively contribute to the success of our work. I would like also to avail myself of this opportunity to assure you of my delegation's full cooperation in achieving the

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desired success of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the objectives to which we are aspiring, particularly the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

On 10 March, I delivered before the meeting of the CD a statement which outlined Egypt's position on the issue of transparency in armaments. And today, prior to the conclusion of the first part of the CD session of 1994, I was keen to define our position on the nuclear items on our agenda being given priority by the CD this year.

Our meeting here reflects a general consensus on the need to protect mankind from the ravages of weapons of mass destruction, weapons which cannot ensure the absolute security of any State. We must therefore pool our efforts with a view to elaborating more effective means to ensure real collective security, primarily through the conclusion of additional disarmament treaties and instruments and by setting up appropriate monitoring and verification mechanisms to ensure compliance with their provisions in the light of the improved international relations which characterize the post-cold-war period. With this in mind I would like today to address some of the important issues which the CD is currently dealing with. Prominent among them is the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, an issue to which we all attribute high priority and which has become the most important issue currently being negotiated in the CD. I will also deal with Egypt's position on an issue of high priority for us, namely security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States, in addition to a new item that we have agreed to include on our agenda, namely a ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes.

With respect to the basic obligations of the comprehensive test-ban treaty which we are currently negotiating, and the elements that we believe should be reflected in the provisions of the treaty, as we have previously stated in our interventions before the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, under the capable chairmanship of our colleague and friend Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, our position is as follows: first, the treaty must prohibit all forms of nuclear test in all environments, whether in the atmosphere, under water or underground, without any distinction among member States.

Second, the treaty should not be viewed merely as a symbol of an international instrument to promote non-proliferation but must be considered as a step leading to the full prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Third, the treaty must contain provisions which ban any activities likely to encourage, assist or provide an appropriate environment for carrying out nuclear tests, including preparatory activities for such tests.

Fourth, the treaty should not set any threshold and must also avert the possibility of improving or modernizing existing nuclear weapons in the possession of some States.

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Fifth, the ban must encompass all nuclear tests, even those that are allegedly peaceful, so as to prevent any future military benefits being derived from such tests.

Sixth, the verification mechanism under the treaty must be of universal application, non-discriminatory and subject to international monitoring. It must also be technically effective, and we are therefore eager to learn about all possible forms of verification, whether seismic or non-seismic and on-site, while following a sophisticated approach which allows for benefits to be derived from any technological advances in this field whenever possible.

Seventh, the basic objective of considering the creation of an international institution to supervise the application of the provisions of the comprehensive test-ban treaty is to ensure monitoring of compliance with its provisions. We therefore believe that it is important that this institution should be neutral, of an international nature and provided with advanced technical capabilities tailored to the responsibilities attributed to it, especially verification activities. The cost must be appropriate, without imposing a heavy additional financial burden on member States, and currently existing mechanisms should be used whenever possible. The institution should comprise an executive body which represents member States and which effectively carries out its international responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the treaty's provisions.

Eighth, the treaty should be universal and include all States and primarily the five permanent member States of the Security Council, in addition to all other States that possess nuclear weapons without exception, as well as an adequate number of other member States to be agreed upon so that the treaty may enter into force at the earliest possible time.

Before moving on to another subject, I would not want to miss the opportunity to welcome the decision by the United States Government on 15 March last to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing to September 1995. We call on all nuclear-weapon States and all threshold States to follow the same approach and to freeze those tests voluntarily until the entry into force of the treaty currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. Such an approach will have a positive impact on our negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Egypt attributes great importance to the issue of concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We consider that the most effective guarantee in this field is the total elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. Naturally, we realize that the achievement of this objective will require some time, and therefore pending its attainment security assurances represent an essential interim requirement for all non-nuclear States. They are also of vital importance in reassuring non-nuclear-weapon States and their peoples and in convincing them not to enter into an arms race to acquire

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similar or alternative types of weapon for purposes of deterrence. Such guarantees will also allow non-nuclear-weapon States to mobilize their human, financial and natural resources for comprehensive economic and social development conducive to the welfare of their peoples in an atmosphere of peace and security. We believe that security assurances in favour of non-nuclear States are a legitimate right of those States. These security assurances should not be conditional, limited or of restricted application. We also believe that those security assurances should be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character and that its provisions should be negotiated in a multilateral forum, namely the Conference on Disarmament.

The envisaged treaty should also include clear and credible commitments that take into consideration the security-related fears of developing countries, particularly in view of the fact that equality of rights and obligations is not observed between States that pursue ambiguous nuclear policies, refuse to place all their nuclear facilities under international control and decline to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty, such as Israel in the Middle East, and States that have voluntarily rejected the nuclear option. Furthermore, the envisaged treaty should clearly indicate that its ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons from our planet and from outer space. We believe that the conclusion of an international treaty in this field would be an important step that should lead to a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, including alleged self-defence. The provision to this effect in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty has not been applied during the last 25 years.

The delegation of Egypt believes, like many member countries of the Conference, that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances should not be confined to addressing negative security assurances but should also extend to the discussion of all the negative and positive aspects of security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States, especially as the title of this item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

It is our view that, given the failure of the NPT to provide adequate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, the ultimate goal of this Ad Hoc Committee should be to formulate a comprehensive and legally binding instrument to provide such security assurances to the countries that have rejected voluntarily both the nuclear option and the possession of nuclear arms. It is therefore logical that such an instrument should replace the current inadequate mechanisms such as Security Council resolution 255, which addresses only positive security assurances in a non-coherent manner that has been rendered outdated by the new realities that dominate the international environment, or the unilateral or multilateral declarations issued by the five nuclear-weapon Powers, which are not of a legally binding nature, could be withdrawn at any time and cannot in themselves form a reliable and sound basis on which to build confidence

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and guarantee the security of countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. Against this background the Egyptian delegation wishes to reaffirm the importance of formulating, within the framework of that Committee, a legally binding treaty that includes the following key elements:

First, a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which are (a) States parties to the NPT, (b) States parties to regional conventions establishing zones free of nuclear weapons, (c) States parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA;

Second, the inherent right of non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain negative as well as positive comprehensive security assurances within the framework of the treaty;

Third, reference should also be made to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which permits the use of force against an aggressor and the imposition of sanctions and coercive measures by the Security Council in the event of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State;

Fourth, the treaty should also embody a clear definition of the assistance that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to receive if they are subjected to nuclear attack or a threat of aggression by nuclear weapons. Such assistance should include technical, scientific, financial and humanitarian aspects. The non-nuclear-weapon States should also be entitled to receive full compensation for the human and material losses that they suffer as a result of such aggression.

In our view, the provision of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States through the conclusion of a separate international treaty is the best available option. However, in the light of the ongoing divergence of opinions in the Conference on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Committee regarding this issue, it may be advisable, since we are approaching the date of the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, to examine the possibility of requesting the NPT conference Preparatory Committee to prepare an additional protocol to the Treaty that includes comprehensive security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States which would be adopted as an annex to the NPT at the 1995 conference pending consideration of its extended application.

At this juncture I would like to reiterate the position of Egypt that I have previously mentioned in the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear security assurances, namely that our final position on the extension of the NPT will ultimately depend on the progress achieved towards an international treaty that provides the requisite security assurances in favour of non-nuclear States as well as the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

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For the first time this year the issue of banning the production of fissile material for military purposes was included on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The Egyptian delegation has already had an opportunity to welcome this development in principle in a statement delivered before the plenary meeting of the CD on 27 January 1994 at the beginning of this session. The Egyptian delegation welcomes today the appointment of Ambassador Gerald Shannon, the Permanent Representative of Canada, as Special Coordinator of the Conference on this issue, and I wish to assure Ambassador Shannon of the full cooperation of the Egyptian delegation in ensuring the success of his critical mission. We look forward to further consultations with him on this matter either bilaterally or in regional groups, particularly the Group of 21, and we will be happy to meet him with the Group. We think that Ambassador Shannon, as Special Coordinator, should organize informal meetings open to all the members of this Conference in order to discuss the dimensions of this issue, ways to deal with it, and its connection with other items on the agenda, especially the nuclear items.

The idea of banning the production of fissile material for military purposes is undoubtedly a positive step that will guide us towards the objective to which we are all aspiring, namely, the realization of non-proliferation pending full nuclear disarmament. We have certain reservations, however, on the wisdom of confining our endeavours to banning only the production of additional fissile material, since declared nuclear-weapon States and also some other non-declared States possess dangerous technology which permits dual uses, as well as a large stockpile of such materials which are being or could be used for the production of missiles and nuclear bombs. Consequently, the Egyptian delegation believes that, when embarking on a study of a ban on the production of those materials, we must extend our efforts and consultations to include the compilation of an inventory of existing fissile material which could be used by any State for military purposes with a view to banning existing stockpiles of such material in addition to prohibiting any further production thereof. Such an approach would add a large degree of transparency with respect to all categories of arms including weapons of mass destruction, particularly the most destructive among them, pending a timely political decision to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and to dismantle them in order to protect mankind and save our environment from destruction and annihilation. It is noteworthy that the international community has prohibited some conventional and highly injurious weapons under the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was concluded on the initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. One of the principal characteristics of international humanitarian law is that the use of such weapons constitutes a crime against humanity. It is only reasonable, therefore, that we should prohibit the production, stockpiling and use of all weapons of mass destruction, including the most destructive, namely, nuclear weapons, which could result in the total annihilation of the human race.

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Finally, concerning the issue of expanding the membership of the Conference, the Egyptian delegation wishes to welcome the appointment of the Permanent Representative of Brazil, Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia, as a Friend of the Chair. We would have preferred him to assume the responsibility of Special Coordinator on this important issue from the very beginning, in order to find an acceptable solution to the expansion of membership so that the composition of the Conference would reflect the increase in the membership of the United Nations since the establishment of the Conference in 1979, as well as the new balance of power in the international community since the end of the cold war. The Egyptian delegation holds the view that, despite the fact that the formula proposed by the previous Special Coordinator, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, commanded near-unanimity, except for the objection of one or two countries to the membership of one or two States which applied for membership of the Conference, this situation should not prevent accession to full CD membership of other candidate countries so that they can participate on an equal footing with the other member States in the negotiation of the international instruments that are accorded priority on the Conference agenda. Within this framework, while welcoming the Mexican initiative, we believe that the efforts of Ambassador Lampreia should not be confined solely to the formula proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan. He should be given an opportunity to hold consultations on any other formula that might offer a basis for consensus. In this regard, I am ready, as a former President of the Conference, to furnish Ambassador Lampreia with the detailed result of my consultations as well as the various formulas which I examined with members and non-members of the Conference from August 1993 until January 1994. I wish him every success in his endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words of support expressed with regard to our work. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Let me at the outset congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference when it addresses important issues for the international community and assure you of our full cooperation.

I have taken the floor today to report to the Conference on the Tokyo Workshop on CTB verification held last week. The Government of Japan hosted a workshop on CTB verification from Monday 14 to Wednesday 16 March, aiming at identifying problems of CTB verification based primarily on seismological methods and trying to seek ways to cope with them in order to promote the CTBT negotiations, and acquainting the workshop participants with Japanese seismic monitoring technologies which could be applicable to the international seismic monitoring system (ISMS).

A total of 38 experts and officials from 24 countries, i.e. Australia, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States actively participated in the discussions, briefings and demonstrations held at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Meteorological Agency. In the plenary meeting where both seismologists and officials in charge of CTBT negotiations were present, they discussed the issues of effectiveness of seismological verification technologies, estimated cost of seismological verification, operation of a seismological verification system in a CTB, and means to supplement seismological verification for a CTB. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the Netherlands, the United States, Norway and Australia, whose representatives made presentations on the four issues respectively, and other participant countries for the comments which their representatives made.

Although the discussions were held in an informal manner to encourage the participants as qualified individuals to exchange their views freely, with no aim of adopting a final document or a report of conclusions, the Japanese delegation feels it may be useful to highlight for the Conference some of the interesting points raised in the workshop.

With respect to "effectiveness of seismological verification technologies", among the important questions addressed in the workshop were such questions as how one could identify a possible nuclear explosion out of so many seismic events taking place every day and who should be responsible for conducting such a task. A reply given in the workshop was that while the ultimate responsibility for the identification work might rest with the national data centre of each State party to the CTBT, the international data centre could do significant work and that the room left for the final judgement of the national authority might be relatively limited. In this connection it was pointed out that the IDC would expeditiously publish seismic bulletins which would include information on the origin time, the location, the depth, the body and surface wave magnitudes of the seismic events detected by the monitoring network, and would keep all relevant information on seismic waves, and that the identification work might be greatly facilitated by such information made available by the IDC. If a seismic event is located at the bottom of the ocean or in a highly populated area, it is unlikely that it was a nuclear explosion. If the epicentre is found to be deeper than 10 kilometres, the event is probably a natural earthquake. The ratio of the body and surface wave magnitudes and the pattern of the wave-form will make a decisive contribution to identifying whether the seismic event in question is a natural earthquake or not. Though it may be difficult for the IDC to give a final analysis on all seismic events, it was argued in the workshop that it would be useful to agree to the procedure with which the IDC would group all seismic data into two categories, namely those which indicate that the event in question is a natural phenomenon and those which raise a doubt that a nuclear explosion may have occurred.

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As for "estimated cost of seismological verification", cost estimates for GSETT-3 were given. It was stated that the overall annual operational costs for GSETT-3 might be US$ 30 million, as the communication costs could be as high as $12 million, and a suggestion was made to consider exemption or reduction of local tariffs to cut significantly the communications costs. No doubt these figures will provide an important basis for the consideration of a future CTBT verification system. Some of the issues which require decisions of a political nature will be how these costs should be borne among the CTBT organization and States parties, and whether we need to consider making a special fund in the future organization.

With respect to "means to supplement seismological verification for a CTB", the participants were reminded of the valuable CD papers including a questionnaire which had already been circulated in the verification Working Group.

And last but not least, the Japan Meterological Agency showed the participants the automated seismic detection system already in operation in Japan. The Agency completely opened to the seismic experts the program of a fully automated method for detecting the arrival times of seismic waves and its application to an on-line processing system, providing them with the papers and floppy disks on the theory with the formulae, diagrams, tables, charts, etc. Japan believes that this method can substantially contribute to the formation of a reliable and cost-effective CTBT verification system.

In conclusion, the Japanese delegation hopes that the Tokyo workshop has given additional food for thought to the participant countries and will make some contribution to the important CTBT negotiations under way here in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador Moser.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I take the floor while you are presiding over the work of this Conference. Your proven diplomatic skills and your abilities as a fine negotiator offer the Conference guarantees for success in its deliberations and will not only be an effective contribution to the advancement of the Conference's work but will also be decisive for the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Allow me also to address the gratitude of the Swiss delegation to the German delegation as well as to the French delegation and to restate our esteem for the exemplary way in which they discharged their functions while presiding over the Conference for the last two terms. I take this opportunity to address our greetings to our new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and the new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, as well as the members of their secretariat.

My Government notes with pleasure that this session of the Conference has commenced in a very positive manner and that organizational matters have been settled in a spirit that has shown the keen interest of these members in addressing questions of substance rapidly. My country is glad that clear priorities have been established to embark on the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We also welcome the fact that a Special Coordinator has been appointed for the question of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and we hope that the consultations now under way will rapidly lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate.

As the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty have begun, my Government learnt with particularly great satisfaction of the decision of the President of the United States to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing in his country until September next year. We welcome this initiative and hope that it will be followed by the other nuclear Powers. The joint observance of a moratorium will doubtless enable the Conference to make substantial progress this year in the negotiations it has just begun.

With regard to the content of the future treaty, I would like to be able to come back to this at a later stage. Today I would just like to say that it is of the greatest importance for my Government that this treaty should be negotiated in a multilateral forum, that it should be universal and non-discriminatory and that it should be accompanied by an effective system of international verification. Allow me to emphasize yet again how happy my Government is that your Conference is preparing to deal resolutely with this question, which has been under discussion for many years, and that at the same time and in the same spirit it is dealing with a number of other matters that could promote a favourable climate on the eve of the review conference on the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. The momentum acquired over recent weeks augurs well and encourages us to look forward to the vital deadline next year in New York with a degree of optimism.

(Mr. Moser, Switzerland)

Allow me to add that my country is also very alive to another subject on your agenda. I am referring to transparency in conventional arms, which my country considers to be another pillar in the future work of this Conference. Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands reminded us with a great deal of clarity in his statement on 24 February of the role that has devolved on the Conference and the contribution expected of it in order to strengthen confidence-building measures which can be seen to be more necessary and more urgent every day. The treatment of this question will also be followed by my country with sustained interest.

As you know, my country has put its name forward for full membership of the Conference. The Swiss Government cannot but regret that the question of expansion is still in abeyance, despite the tireless efforts that have been made over the last few months, for which we would like to express our deep gratitude, to you and your predecessors, particularly Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, Ambassador Errera of France and Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to express also our profound appreciation to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, who has recently been recalled for important duties in his capital. Having spared no effort as Special Coordinator on the question of expansion, Ambassador O'Sullivan proposed a solution that generally speaking was welcomed as being intelligent, balanced and fully in keeping with the credibility of the Conference. I noted with satisfaction Ambassador Hoffmann's appeal to the Conference when he took up the Chair, which you have just repeated today, Mr. President, to settle this question as soon as possible and thus be able to play fully its role as a universal negotiating body. The appointment of Ambassador Lampreia as a Friend of the Chair seems to be a step in the right direction. In concluding these brief remarks I would like to reiterate my country's profound attachment to the Conference on Disarmament. Above and beyond our interest in the substance of your work, I can confirm that intense efforts are currently being made by my authorities in order to give the members of the Conference complete satisfaction on the issue of the status of its representatives in Geneva. Köszönöm szépen.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your statement and for your words that were not only very kind, but also expressed in Hungarian.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Hou.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, first of all I would like to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the CD. I am confident that your extraordinary ability and rich experience as a seasoned diplomat will help bring new progress to the work of this Conference. Allow me to pledge to you and all other delegations the continued close cooperation of the

(Mr. Hou, China)

Chinese delegation. I would also like to express my thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann, for his outstanding contributions. Since I am taking the floor for the first time at this session, allow me to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the CD and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Petrovsky's profound knowledge of international political and disarmament affairs and his extensive experience are invaluable assets to all of us. I also take great pleasure in offering my congratulations to Mr. Bensmail on his promotion to be Deputy Secretary-General of the CD and head of the Geneva branch of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. I would also like to associate myself with the warm welcome expressed by other speakers to the distinguished Ambassadors who recently took up their posts in the CD. They are Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil and Ambassador Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Tarre Murzi of Venezuela, Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Starr of Australia. At the same time I join others in saying goodbye to the Ambassadors who recently left their posts here, Ambassador Arteaga of Venezuela, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia. I would like to wish all of them every success in their new endeavours.

With the end of the cold war, the world is entering a new historical period of great transformation. The tendency towards a multi-polar world is growing increasingly evident. The overall international situation is heading towards relaxation, with development issues increasingly featured. However, the world today remains a restless place marked by local and regional turbulence and even non-stop wars and conflicts. The North-South gap continues to widen, and contradictions are deepening. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. It follows that the safeguarding of world peace and the promotion of economic development are still serious challenges facing the international community. In this unfolding and volatile international situation China has steadfastly adhered to the fundamental line of opening to the outside world and modernization and gained significant achievements. The Government of China has consistently pursued its independent foreign policy of peace. Relations of friendly cooperation between our country and the other countries in the world have expanded further, and this has played a positive role in the safeguarding of world peace and the promotion of economic development.

The world today is complex and diverse. Countries differ from each other in social system, ideology, culture and tradition, national characteristics, religious belief, etc. Recognition of this diversity and difference of the modern-day world is the premise for the development of international relations. The Chinese Government has repeatedly called for the establishment of a peaceful, stable, just and rational new international economic and political order based on the purposes of the United Nations Charter and the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Under this new international order mutual respect among States and their equal sovereignty will replace power politics. Peaceful negotiation and dialogue will replace the use or threat of use of force. Mutual benefit and

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cooperation will replace plunder and exploitation. Only in this way can countries live together in peace, harmony and joint development. The Chinese Government will, as always, spare no efforts in working together with all the countries of the world for this new world order and for the promotion of lasting world peace and joint development.

Now I would like once again to outline China's principled standpoints and propositions on important agenda items such as nuclear disarmament, the nuclear test ban and security assurances.

During the first half of this century mankind suffered from the scourge of two world wars. In the half-century since nuclear weapons came into existence, mankind has been living under the phantom of a possible nuclear war. That is why early realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons has become a fundamental objective of mankind. The halting of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war is thus a priority item on the agenda of the CD.

In recent years the United States and the Russian Federation have reached a number of meaningful agreements on the reduction of their nuclear weapons, which we welcome. At the same time, one also notes that even when all these agreements are fully implemented the fact remains that the two countries still possess the biggest and the most sophisticated and advanced nuclear arsenals in the world. Therefore, as stated in the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions and documents, these countries should continue to undertake and fulfil their special responsibilities for complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.

China has never shirked its responsibility for promoting nuclear disarmament. It has always stood for the fundamental objectives of early realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and has made untiring efforts and important contributions in this regard. It is known to all that since the first day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has solemnly declared to the world its unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. China has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has on many occasions strongly appealed to other nuclear-weapon States to undertake similar commitments and to conclude as early as possible an international convention to this end.

In order to promote the process of nuclear disarmament and realize the goal of preventing nuclear war, the Chinese Government has recently taken further new initiatives. On 23 December last the Chinese Government formally proposed to the United States, the Russian Federation and other nuclear-weapon States that negotiations should be started among the five nuclear-weapon States with a view to concluding a treaty against the first use of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of March the Chinese Government once again urged the other four

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nuclear-weapon States to respond positively to this proposal and once again invited them to send their delegations to Beijing for negotiations. It is the view of the Chinese Government that in the present international situation the conditions are right for the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate and conclude such an international treaty. China believes that the conclusion of this treaty will significantly reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and provide security for the five nuclear-weapon States, especially the small- and medium-sized ones among them. It would also improve mutual trust and contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Finally, it will have an important role to play in realizing a comprehensive nuclear test ban and promoting nuclear disarmament. China is of the view that the questions of refraining from the first use of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban are closely interrelated. It sincerely hopes that the countries concerned will give a positive response to China's initiative and start early negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty against the first use of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. China also hopes that the five States will join together to promote vigorously the negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-free zones, so as to make a decisive contribution to freeing mankind from the threat of a nuclear war.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to and actively participates in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. We have noted with pleasure that under the able guidance of the Chairman, Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, the Ad Hoc Committee has quickly and smoothly proceeded to its work this year. It is our hope that the Committee will achieve substantive progress this year, which will be favourable to the CTBT negotiations and to the smooth convening of the NPT review conference.

As early as 16 years ago the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament correctly pointed out that "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind". Thereafter, this proposition was reaffirmed in the resolutions of successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. China has always actively supported this proposition. China has consistently pursued the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and stood for the realization of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests within this framework. Proceeding from this fundamental position, China has always exercised maximum restraint in its nuclear testing. China's nuclear tests are few and far between, with the lowest number of tests among all nuclear Powers. China fully understands the sincere wish of vast numbers of non-nuclear-weapon States for the early conclusion of a CTBT in the belief that such a treaty will contribute to the realization of the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chinese Government issued a statement

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on 5 October last year reiterating its relevant principled positions and propositions. The statement emphasized that China supports the early conclusion of a CTBT and that it would join the other countries in this negotiation in an effort to conclude such a treaty no later than 1996. China joined the consensus on a resolution on the issue of a CTBT adopted by the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. At present, following my Government's instructions, the Chinese delegation is actively participating in the negotiation with a businesslike and responsible attitude in order to make its contribution to the conclusion of an effectively verifiable CTBT which will be able to attract universal adherence.

It is gratifying to the Chinese delegation that at the outset of this year's session the Conference on Disarmament, under the presidency of Ambassador Errera of France, quickly set up an historically significant Ad Hoc Committee on the nuclear-test-ban issue, smoothly adopted a sound mandate and unanimously elected the very experienced Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico as its Chairman. Now that the Ad Hoc Committee has started its work, we are confident that under the leadership of its skilful Chairman and the guidance of the chairmen of two working groups, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany and Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, the Committee will live up to the expectations of all sides in making substantive progress in the negotiation of a CTBT.

There are many complex issues before the NTB Committee. Now I would like to make some preliminary comments on the negotiation process. First, China fully supports the Ad Hoc Committee in vigorously negotiating a truly universal and effectively verifiable CTBT in accordance with its mandate. The purpose of such a treaty should be, as specified in the mandate, to "contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". Second, in view of the importance and universality of the future CTBT, the negotiations on a CTBT and the provisions thereof should fully reflect the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and the generally recognized norms of international relations. There is also the need to ensure the sovereign equality of States and a balance between rights and obligations. Third, we are of the view that the key provisions on the basic obligations and the scope of prohibition of the CTBT must conform fully with the fundamental purposes of the CTBT. To this end strict, precise and clear-cut texts should be worked out on the basis of sufficient and in-depth discussions and negotiations. There should be no loopholes or ambiguities which will give rise to different interpretations, misunderstandings or disputes in the future. Therefore, instead of copying the text of some agreements of the 1960s and 1970s, we should arrive at definitions and provisions truly in conformity with the purposes of the CTBT in the light of today's reality and possible future situations. For example, the CTBT should not become another partial test ban or a merely restrictive treaty. Rather, it should prohibit at any place and in any environment any nuclear-weapon test explosion of any form which releases nuclear energy.

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Fourth, the proper solution of the verification problem is another complex and difficult task in the CTBT negotiations. We are of the view that verification is closely linked to the provisions on the scope of prohibition and the basic obligations and therefore should be worked out after the settlement of the issues related to definitions. We believe that the verification clauses and arrangements should be strict, effective, fair and reasonable, and should reflect the basic principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the verification of disarmament and arms control agreements. While States parties to the treaty should abide by the treaty and honour their obligations to accept fair verification, they are also entitled to share verification-related information and relevant resources and technology. Abuse of verification leading to unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of States parties and infringements of their security must be prevented.

Fifth, it is our view that seeking an appropriate solution to the issue of security assurances to States parties is to be one of the tasks in the CTBT negotiations. The CTBT is an international legal instrument with a direct bearing on the paramount security interests of States parties. As correctly provided for in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the CTBT should promote the process of nuclear disarmament and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. For this purpose the treaty should contain provision for States parties with nuclear weapons to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties which do not possess nuclear weapons. At the same time it should also provide for States parties with nuclear weapons to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. We are deeply convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States enter into the above-mentioned obligations it will add to the substance of the CTBT, further the treaty's universality and constitute a major contribution to international peace and security.

Sixth, like many other delegations we have to stress that the Ad Hoc Committee must also resolve the extremely important and complex issue of entry into force of the CTBT. It goes without saying that the article on EIF must be brought into line with the principles of universality and the main purposes of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament. The CD must also seek a speedy and appropriate solution to the important issue of its expansion, because this is not only related to the strengthening of the CD's role in international political and security affairs but also intertwined with the CTBT negotiations and the smooth resolution of the EIF issues. There should be no more excuses whatsoever to keep a large number of non-member States outside the CD and exclude them from taking part in the CTBT negotiations. We welcome the appointment of Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil as a Friend of the Chair on the question of expansion of the CD membership and hope that the positive efforts made by him and the President of the CD will be crowned with success. We also thank Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, for his important contribution. Members of the international community are anxiously

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waiting for a successful solution of this problem, and we can no longer let them down.

Finally, I am instructed to take up another issue here. Recently the Chinese delegation noticed that document CD/NTB/WG.2/11 submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands was distributed in the Working Group on Legal and Institutional Issues of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. That document went so far as to list Taiwan, which is an integral part of the territory of China, as a country among the countries with operational nuclear power reactors. It is known to all that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a province of China. The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate Government representing the whole of China, and enjoys the recognition of the United Nations and the international community, including all the countries which have established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese delegation is hereby authorized to reject categorically the listing of Taiwan as a country in document CD/NTB/WG.2/11 of the delegation of the Netherlands. We resolutely oppose attempts by anybody or any country to create a concept of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". Upon instructions from my Government, I hereby formally request through you, Sir, that the Conference on Disarmament and its NTB Ad Hoc Committee should immediately take the necessary remedial measures.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement, of which due note was taken, and I also thank him for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Bisley.

Mr. BISLEY (New Zealand): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency. My delegation looks forward to close cooperation with you, and we regard it as a heavy augury that in the first statement that we make under your presidency, we should address the question of transparency in armaments, an area in respect of which you have assumed special responsibilities.

Proposals to control or restrain conventional weaponry have been before the United Nations since 1950, and with the League of Nations even before that. For many reasons, most have not succeeded, and our few successes have been very modest. But times have changed: as the United Nations Secretary-General noted in his paper "New dimensions in arms regulation and disarmament ...", we have a new opportunity to revitalize our efforts in the field of conventional arms. An important aspect of that effort will be the contribution made by this Conference and by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. New Zealand was among those who co-sponsored resolution 46/36 L which established the United Nations Register. The New Zealand Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control welcomed the establishment of the Register as an important step towards addressing the problem of excessive arms transfers.

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

New Zealand is a firm supporter of the United Nations Register. We participated fully in 1993, and will do so again this year. Our general objective is to produce the greatest level of transparency possible when providing our national return under the United Nations Register. Furthermore, we are in favour of strengthening and expanding the Register; we intend to make a contribution on this subject to the United Nations Secretary-General in April this year, as requested by resolution 46/36 L. We hope that other Member States will do the same. In preparing that submission, my delegation would commend to others the advantages of including defence officials at an early date. The involvement of defence officials in transparency exercises - which are very new concepts for many countries - is essential to the success of transparency in armaments in general and to the United Nations Register in particular.

I would like to turn to the work of the Conference in the area of transparency in armaments. As you know, the panel of experts established to review the functioning and expansion of the United Nations Register has been tasked to take into consideration the work of the Conference on Disarmament. That is a mandate which my delegation interprets broadly, and which we believe allows the Conference to develop a view on the future of the United Nations Register itself.

The United Nations Register has made an encouraging start, especially in terms of the sheer volume of transfers covered and by securing the participation of the largest arms producers. It has revealed a number of transfers not previously known to the international community; has also provided more up-to-date information on the actual timing of weapons delivered in a number of cases; and has provided an important source of officially endorsed information on arms transfers. The most serious weakness facing the Register at present is the limited extent of participation by Member States in its first year of operation. The level of participation achieved was around what most realistic commentators expected, but it fell well short of the 150 States who voted in favour of resolution 46/36 L.

The first priority of the Register must be to secure universal adherence for four reasons. First, to ensure that those States who are presently participating continue to do so. The Register relies on reciprocity in order to build mutual confidence; if some important States remain outside the regime. those already involved may be put at a disadvantage, and they will have a reduced incentive to remain. Secondly, we also need to encourage wider adherence so that the Register will cover more fully those parts of the world where it is most needed. The Middle East, Africa and East Asia were underrepresented among the 1993 returns. Thirdly, because if the Register is to expand into holdings and national production, the measure of its success will not just be the volume of transfers or the involvement of the major arms producers. The measure of success for an expanded Register will be participation by States who face internal, regional or bilateral security problems, and the degree to which they feel that the Register enhances their security. Finally, we need to secure universal adherence in order

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to make hay while the sun shines. Wide adherence will be easier to secure now when the obligations of the Register are fewer and the international environment less threatening in some important senses than it has been for many decades.

Turning to the subject of future development, I would like to comment on some desirable changes to the present Register. The early expansion of the Register to include military holdings and national production, foreseen in resolution 46/36 L, is highly desirable. By including these areas we will have removed the legitimate concern that the Register discriminates against importers of conventional arms. A further (technical) reason for widening the scope of the Register is to provide for a more complete assessment of a State's military capability. Keeping in mind that one of the key objectives of the Register is to give a fuller picture of a State's overall military capability, this cannot be done with annual snapshots of transfers; the addition of holdings and production is needed to provide for a more rounded picture of aggregate conventional military capability. A useful addition in this context, perhaps as background information to the Register or as a stand-alone CBM, would be annual declarations on the size and structure of one's armed forces, as suggested already by the United Kingdom in WP.5.

New Zealand was therefore interested in the proposals made last year by the United States and France on the expansion of the Register to include military holdings and national production; I refer to WP.4 and WP.9. With respect to the detail of those proposals, my delegation offers the following comments. For reasons of consistency and administrative ease, we agree that the categories adopted for holdings and production should be the same as those used for transfers; that they should be reported to the same level of detail as the categories for transfers; and on the same annual date. In terms of definitions, we would prefer a more comprehensive approach in order to give a better picture of a State's overall capabilities, and so as to avoid leaving gaps which would effectively omit some equipment. Debate has often centred around what should be included when defining "armed forces" or "procurement through national production". Another way to look at this issue is to say that "everything is in unless ruled out". For example, armed forces should include any organization under the State which controls weapons defined by the Register, including coastguards, interior ministry or security forces, and reservists. Military holdings should include all conventional arms specified by the Register and under the control of the State concerned, including that which is mothballed and that which is awaiting export. But we would exclude equipment under development or research, and that which is placed in historical collection, since the quantities involved in those areas would not likely be significant in quantitative terms. As for national production, we prefer the definition provided by France in WP.8, that is, "all conventional equipment as defined for the purposes of the Register, allocated to the armed forces during the period under consideration from national production, including cooperative production". We would advocate this definition on the basis that it would more comprehensively cover equipment as soon as it leaves the factory, rather than waiting for entry into operational service. We

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

also believe it important to take greater account, as this definition does, of co-production arrangements.

In the full statement distributed to delegations I have made a number of further suggestions regarding ways to develop and expand the Register, including on the transfer of high technology with military application, weapons of mass destruction and the reporting format. For the sake of brevity, I shall not read all those sections now. No doubt there is more that could be added on these topics. But we are conscious of the fact, as I noted earlier, that encouraging wider adherence to the Register should be our first priority. On that basis, I believe we should temper our desire for expansion to ensure that we do not move too fast or too far for all Member States. The need for simplicity and stability, and for a measured approach to the expansion of the Register, especially in its early stages of development, should be borne in mind. That would be a great advantage in encouraging wide, full and accurate participation.

In conclusion, the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important achievement in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Register has provided the international community with an important tool with which to begin addressing the problem of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weaponry. It has also established a new, if still weak, international norm relating to the need for transparency in arms transfers as a means of building confidence between States. Furthermore, the Register is the first fruit of a "new dimension" in international security and arms control. But the international community will need to test continually the underlying logic of the Register and hence the logic which drives the debate on transparency in armaments in this Conference: how much transparency can States actually tolerate, and how soon can they do it? We will need to be very conscious of the fact that more transparency does not necessarily equal more security. This is an area where the Conference on Disarmament has a particular role: the Register does not stand alone, but as part of a wider effort. There are important linkages to be made in this respect to issues of high technology with military application and weapons of mass destruction. Those wider efforts must operate at many levels, including national and regional. The Register represents only one dimension of this effort; the other facets must not be neglected.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Bisley for his statement devoted to questions of transparency in armaments and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH (Sweden): Mr. President, first I want to congratulate you upon the assumption of your presidency, which will last also over the recess of the Conference. I can promise you the full cooperation of the Swedish delegation. I also want to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, for the eminent work he has done during his presidency.

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

I have asked for the floor today to express for the record the great satisfaction of the Swedish Government at the decision of the United States to prolong its moratorium on nuclear testing through September 1995. In the Swedish view that decision, which was very timely, will have a positive effect on the ongoing negotiations here in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is our hope that France and Russia will also extend their moratoria and that China will undertake no new nuclear tests. My delegation is convinced that a total absence of tests during the negotiating period would influence the negotiations in a very positive way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the congratulations he extended to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. I should like to ask if any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. I recognize the distinguished representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. GEVERS (Netherlands): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency. I can assure you of my delegation's full support and confidence that you will guide our work in an excellent manner. I would also like to take this occasion to thank the previous President, Ambassador Hoffmann, for his performance and for his help in all the work of this Conference.

I am taking the floor today to briefly refer to an earlier statement by the representative of the People's Republic of China. The distinguished representative of the People's Republic of China has made a brief reference to a Working Group paper distributed by my delegation some time ago in order to provide information on the issue of the entry into force of a future CTBT. I would like to state that the listings and the names which featured in the Netherlands paper were based on lists, titles and names as released in documents of IAEA in Vienna. My delegation regrets if the Netherlands paper gave rise to confusion. The paper was meant to be of assistance. It had no political connotations. My delegation will, of course, be open to any improvements in the paper which the Conference sees fit.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Gevers, for your explanatory statement and for your kind words addressed to the Chair. Are there other delegations asking for the floor?

If this is not the case, may I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. I should like to add one proposal to this informal timetable, namely concerning the time of the next Presidential consultations. Usually, we have Presidential consultations each Wednesday at 3.30 p.m. Now, I would suggest exceptionally that all those who participate in this Presidential meeting come at 4 p.m. because I have to attend another meeting

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before, and I wish to be there on time. If there is no objection to this proposal, then I would convene the next Presidential meeting for Wednesday, 30 March 1994 at 4 p.m. in the CD secretariat conference room. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal timetable. Since I see no objection, I consider it adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This not being the case, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. We still have some time until 1 o'clock and I have been requested by the Chairman of the NTB Working Group I to have a meeting now, so I would propose that the remaining time be used for a meeting of Working Group I under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann. Do the participants agree? If so, I adjourn the plenary meeting and I request Ambassador Hoffmann to take the Chair. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place on Thursday, 31 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.